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CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THE ELEMENTS OF WILLIAMS ACT
"MANIPULATION"-VALIDITY OF TENDER OFFER
DEFENSES UNCERTAIN
JOSEPH B. CAHILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most significant tactical development of the last twenty years
in the corporate takeover arena is the emergence of the cash tender
offer as the favorite weapon of takeover bidders. With devastating sud-
denness, a hostile tender offeror can overrun a target corporation, cap-
turing voting control of the company in a matter of weeks. The key to
the effectiveness of the cash tender offer is that it allows the offeror to
acquire the target corporation directly from its shareholders, thereby
rendering the target's management powerless to resist the takeover.
The ubiquitous spectre of the cash tender offer as a potential threat
to the ascendancy of the incumbent managers of virtually all public
corporations has prompted directors of many companies to devise
methods of defense against hostile tender offers. Recent years have
seen the deployment of a wide array of innovative tender offer defenses
by target companies, and by companies seeking to discourage prospec-
tive tender offerors. These new defensive strategies have increased sig-
nificantly the duration, intensity and costliness of tender offer struggles.
As the ferocity and expense of these battles have continued to es-
calate, they increasingly have spilled over into the courts, as bloodied
combatants challenge the legality of their opponents' tactics. The rap-
idly proliferating arsenal of tender offer defensive weaponry has been
the subject of much of this recent litigation. Most of the challenges to
the validity of tender offer defensive measures have been raised in fed-
eral court under the Williams Act,' the federal statute which regulates
tender offers.
Recently, a dispute has arisen as to the interpretation of the key
antifraud provision of the Act. 2 The Courts of Appeals have split on
* B.A. Political Science, St. Norbert College, 1981; Candidate for J.D. lIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1985. The author would like to express appreciation to Professor Carole B. Silver,
lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, whose insights and advice were of great value in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e), (f) (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). This section prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
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the meaning of "manipulative acts" as contained in Section 14(e) of the
Act.3 The Second and Third Circuits have held that the ban on "ma-
nipulative acts" in Section 14(e) is directed only at conduct involving
misrepresentation or nondisclosure in connection with a tender offer.4
The Second and Third Circuits have specifically rejected5 the Sixth
Circuit's holding that Section 14(e) "manipulation" includes any action
which disturbs the competitive balance among the parties to a tender
offer, regardless of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 6
This article will discuss the competing interpretations of Section
14(e), and analyze the arguments in support of each. The analysis will
contrast the decisions of the Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge Company
v. Ogden Corporation,7 and the Third Circuit in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.,8 which found misrepresentation or nondisclosure to be
required elements of Section 14(e) "manipulation", 9 with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's holding in Mobil Corporation v. Marathon Oil Company0 that
Section 14(e) can be violated without misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure. II An examination of the bases of these three decisions, other judi-
cial interpretations of Section 14(e), and the purpose of the Williams
Act shows that Buffalo Forge and Schreiber correctly interpret "manip-
ulation" under Section 14(e).
II. THE TENDER OFFER SETTING
The cash tender offer has proven to be a highly effective method of
taking over a corporation. A tender offer is simply an offer to purchase
stock at a premium made directly to the shareholders of a corporation.
If the holders of a controlling percentage of the target company's stock
accept the offer, or "tender" their shares, the tender offeror obtains con-
trol of the corporation.' 2 The speed and efficiency of this process has
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation."
3. Id
4. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 550
(1984); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W.
3204 (Oct. 2, 1984).
5. 717 F.2d at 760; 731 F.2d at 166.
6. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
7. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1984).
8. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3204 (Oct. 2, 1984).
9. 717 F.2d at 760, 731 F.2d at 166.
10. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
11. Id at 377.
12. For background on the various methods of executing and resisting corporate takeovers,
see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL (1977); P. DAVEY, DEFENSE AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS
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made the tender offer extremely popular among takeover bidders seek-
ing fast and simple acquisitions.
The ease by which control of a company can be acquired through
the tender offer device exposes corporate managers to the constant
threat of a takeover of their company by a bidder who, upon gaining
control, may dispense with their services. Understandably, managers
of target corporations have developed methods of resisting tender offers
by persons hostile to their interests. These defensive measures are
designed to resist tender offers altogether, or in the alternative, to se-
cure a takeover by someone friendly to the target management.13
One of the most common and effective of these defensive tactics is
the "lock-up" arrangement.' 4 This arrangement seeks to defeat a
tender offeror hostile to target management by ensuring the success of a
friendly bidder, or "White Knight." 15 Lock-ups usually take the form
of a grant of stock or asset purchase options to the favored bidder.' 6
The dual effect of such options is to give the White Knight an advan-
tage in the bidding contest for the target company and make the target
unattractive to the hostile bidder.17
The legality of tender offer defenses, including lock-up arrange-
ments, has been challenged in many recent cases.' 8 The usual claim in
these cases has been that the defensive measure is barred by the Wil-
liams Act. 19 This claim is based on the assertion that the defensive
measure is a "manipulative practice" prohibited by Section 14(e) of the
Act.20 Thus, judicial interpretations of the purpose and meaning of the
Williams Act, particularly Section 14(e), have a profound impact on
the ability of corporate managers to resist tender offers.
(1977); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS (1978); A. FLEISCHER,
TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1983).
13. See Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques- Creeping Tender Offers,
Lockup Arrangements and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1108 (1982).
14. Id.
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355
(7th Cir. 1983); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 550 (1984).
19. See cases cited supra note 18.
20. E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Buffalo Forge v.
Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 550 (1984).
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III. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 14(E)
A. The Sixth Circuit Viewpoint
In Mobil Corporation v. Marathon Oil Company2' the Sixth Circuit
attributed a broad purpose to the Williams Act. 22 Breaking with previ-
ous constructions,23 the Mobil court held that the Act requires more
than full disclosure by the parties to a tender offer, and that "manipula-
tion" under Section 14(e) can occur without misrepresentation or non-
disclosure.2 4 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit held that the Williams Act
requires that all tender offerors be allowed to compete on equal terms
for shares in the target company.25
The case involved a challenge to the validity under Section 14(e)
of defensive measures taken by Marathon Oil Company to ward off a
takeover by Mobil Corporation. 26 In order to defeat Mobil's tender
offer of $85 per share for a majority of Marathon stock, Marathon's
directors solicited a tender offer from United States Steel.27 In ex-
change for U.S. Steel's tender offer of $125 per share for a majority of
Marathon's stock, Marathon granted U.S. Steel an option to purchase
ten million unissued Marathon shares for $90 each, and an option to
purchase Marathon's "crown jewel", an interest in the Yates oil field.28
The Yates field option could be exercised only if U.S. Steel's tender
offer failed, and another party acquired Marthon. 29 Mobil filed an ac-
tion seeking to enjoin these options as "manipulative devices" under
Section 14(e). 30
The Sixth Circuit held that the options were "manipulative"
21. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 376-77.
23. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
24. 669 F.2d at 377. The Sixth Circuit stated: "In short, to find compliance with section
14(e) solely by the full disclosure of a manipulative device as afai' accompli would be to read the
'manipulative acts and practices' language completely out of the Williams Act." ld
25. Id. at 376. No court had ever before construed the Williams Act as a mechanism to
ensure that competing tender offerors have equal standing in the battle for control.
26. Id at 368. Mobil generated a great deal of scholarly comment, most of it unfavorable.
See Note, Tender Offers, Lock-ups and the Williams Act." 4 Critical Analysis of Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 21 DuQ. L. REV. 669 (1983); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics-Federal
Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (1982); Note, The Future of
Lock-upsAfter Mobil v. Marathon Oil, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 261 (1983); Note, Swallowing the Key
to Lock-up Options. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1055 (1983); but see
Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipula-
tion, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Comment, Takeover Developments-Defining "Tender Offer"
and "Manipulation" Under the Williams Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199 (1983).
27. 669 F.2d at 367.
28. Id.
29. ld
30. Id at 368.
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within the meaning of Section 14(e). 31 In reaching this conclusion, the
court held that Section 14(e) "manipulation" includes all conduct
which "artificially affects" the price of a target company's stock.32 The
court supported this broad construction partially on the grounds of the
Supreme Court's statement in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,33 that
the federal securities laws are meant to "prohibit the full range of inge-
nious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices. ' 34
The only other support Mobil offered for its broad interpretation of
"manipulation" was a case interpreting the term as used in the Com-
modities Exchange Act.35
Applying its broad reading of the Williams Act to the case before
it, the Sixth Circuit found that the Yates field purchase option created
an illegal "artificial ceiling" on the price of Marathon stock at the level
of the U.S. Steel offer.36 According to the court, no other tender offeror
would seek to top U.S. Steel's bid, because a rival bidder would not be
able to obtain Marathon's interest in the oil field.37 Similarly, the stock
purchase option was "manipulative" because it enabled U.S. Steel to
obtain control of Marathon at a lower cost than could a competing
tender offeror. 38 The court concluded that the options deterred com-
peting tender offers for Marathon, thereby "artificially affecting" the
price of Marathon stock.39 The Sixth Circuit held that this "artificial
effect" rendered the options invalid as "manipulative acts" under Sec-
tion 14(e), regardless of the absence of any misrepresentation or non-
disclosure in connection with the options. 4°
The Mobil court's invalidation of the lock-up clearly was moti-
vated by its perception that the options were unfair to the Marathon
stockholders.4' The court pointed out that, by deterring competing
tender offers, the options forced shareholders to choose between
31. Id. at 374.
32. Id (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976)).
33. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
34. Id. at 477.
35. 669 F.2d at 374 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972)). Cargill held that "manipulation" in the commodities context means "con-
duct. . . which has resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and demand."
452 F.2d at 1163. The use of a commodities case shows the weakness of the Mobilreasoning, as it
is inconsistent with the passage from Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied 425
U.S. 986 (1976), cited in Mobil, which holds that "manipulation" has a unique meaning in connec-
tion with securities activities. 425 U.S. at 199.
36. 669 F.2d at 375.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 376-77. No other motivation for the Mobil decision is apparent in the opinion.
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tendering their shares up front to U.S. Steel at $125 per share, or "being
relegated to the 'back end'" of USS's takeover proposal and receiving
only $90 per share.42 Indeed, the sole basis for the court's displeasure
with the "artificial effect" of the options was that they precluded the
shareholders from obtaining a better price from putative competing
tender offerors.43
Despite unequivocal Supreme Court precedent to the effect that
complaints by shareholders about the fairness of corporate transactions
are really allegations of breaches of state law fiduciary duties,44 the
Mobil court insisted that the claim was cognizable under the Williams
Act.45 Although the court found the options to be violative of Section
14(e), it refused to address the question of whether or not the Marathon
directors had breached their fiduciary duties in granting the options. 46
The court held that the Section 14(e) breach lay not in the grant of the
options by Marathon, but in the "demand" for the options by U.S.
Steel.47 This somewhat awkward conclusion perhaps can be attributed
to the court's displeasure with the fact that U.S. Steel conditioned its
offer on the grant of the lock-up options.48
B. The Second Circuit Response to Mobil
The Second Circuit recently adopted a view of the purpose of the
Williams Act and an interpretation of Section 14(e) "manipulation" di-
ametrically opposed to the Sixth Circuit position. In Buffalo Forge
Company v. Ogden Corporation,49 the Second Circuit was called upon
to review the permissibility under Section 14(e) of tender offer defenses
virtually identical to those held illegal in Mobil.50 Despite the similar-
ity of the challenged tactics to the options invalidated in Mobil, the
Second Circuit refused to follow Mobilin deciding Buffalo Forge.5' In-
stead, the Second Circuit adhered to a narrower interpretation of the
Williams Act which allows more leeway for target defenses. 52
42. Id at 377.
43. Id at 376-77. The court ignores the fact that the options attracted an offering price for
Marathon stock $40 per share higher than the only previous bid, Mobil's offer of $85 per share.
44. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
45. 669 F.2d at 374.
46. Id
47. Id at 377. The court offers no reasoning for its refusal to hold the Marathon directors
liable for their participation in the lock-up arrangement.
48. See id
49. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 550 (1984).
50. Id at 758-59.
51. Id at 760.
52. See id. Essentially, the Second Circuit held that Section 14(e) prohibits only misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure in connection with a tender offer. Id
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The Buffalo Forge litigation arose from the battle between two
tender offerors for control of the Buffalo Forge Company. 53 The con-
test for control of Buffalo Forge began when Ampco-Pittsburgh Corpo-
ration (Ampco) made a tender offer of $25 per share for any and all
outstanding shares of Buffalo Forge common stock. 54 After consider-
ing this offer, the Board of Directors of Buffalo Forge concluded that it
was financially inadequate and contrary to the best interests of Buffalo
Forge and its shareholders. 55 After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain
an injunction against the Ampco tender offer, the directors initiated a
search for a more attractive tender offer.56
The Buffalo Forge directors were able to persuade Ogden Corpo-
ration to make a competing tender offer of $32.75 per share for Buffalo
Forge.57 In order to secure the Ogden bid, the directors agreed to sell
Ogden 425,000 shares of Buffalo Forge treasury stock for $32.75 per
share, to be paid for by a 10-year, nine percent note.58 The directors
also granted Ogden a one-year option to purchase an additional
143,400 Buffalo Forge treasury shares on similar terms. 59
The Ogden tender offer touched off a bidding war between Ogden
and Ampco for Buffalo Forge stock, which Ampco ultimately won with
an offer of $37.50 for any and all shares.60 Upon completing the
purchase of a majority of the stock of Buffalo Forge, Ampco obtained
the resignations of the Buffalo Forge directors. 6' Subsequently, Ampco
merged Buffalo Forge into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ampco. 62
After taking control of Buffalo Forge, Ampco refused to honor the
stock purchase and option agreements entered by Buffalo Forge and
Ogden. 63 Ampco withheld dividends on the 425,000 shares of stock
purchased by Ogden, and would not allow Ogden to exercise its option
to purchase the remaining 143,400 treasury shares. 64 Ampco sought
recission of the agreements in federal district court, contending that the
stock sale and option were "manipulative devices" under Section 14(e)
53. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), afT'd 717 F.2d 757
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1984).
54. Id. at 897.
55. Id. at 898.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 901.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id. at 903.
61. Id.
62. Id
63. Id.
64. Id.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
of the Williams Act.65 The district court rejected this contention, 66 and
Ampco appealed to the Second Circuit.67
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
attempted lock-up of the Buffalo Forge-Ogden acquisition was not a
"manipulative device" under Section 14(e). 68 The court held that the
only purpose of the Williams Act is to provide stockholders with all the
information they need in order to make an informed decision when
faced with a tender offer for their stock.69 Therefore, the court stated
that "an essential ingredient" of a violation of Section 14(e) is misrep-
resentation, which it defined as the "omission or misstatement of mate-
rial facts."' 70 Under this interpretation of Section 14(e), the court found
that the full and accurate disclosure of the stock sale and option agree-
ments satisfied the statute.71
The Second Circuit specifically rejected the Sixth Circuit's expan-
sive reading of the Williams Act.72 The Buffalo Forge court called the
Mobil use of Section 14(e) to ban fully disclosed lock-up agreements an
"unwarranted extension of the Williams Act.' 73 The court pointed out
that the Mobil decision was based on the Sixth Circuit's concern with
the substantive fairness of the Mobil tender offer, a consideration not
reached by the Williams Act.74 Holding that the Mobil court exceeded
the mandate of the Williams Act, the Second Circuit emphasized that
the Supreme Court has declared the Act to be purely a disclosure stat-
ute unconcerned with the substantive fairness of tender offers.75
C The Third Circuit Position
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,76 the Third Circuit en-
dorsed the Buffalo Forge view that Section 14(e) prohibits only conduct
65. Id. at 896.
66. Id at 905-06.
67. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 550
(1984).
68. Id at 759.
69. Id at 760 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977)).
70. Id. (citing Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 951 (1980),
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 910
(1973); Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1983); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id, quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976
(1977).
76. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3204 (Oct. 2, 1984).
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involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The case arose from
Burlington Northern's bid for control of the El Paso Gas Company.77
The acquisition attempt began with a Burlington tender offer for 25.1
million shares of El Paso at $24 per share.78 Despite efforts by the El
Paso management to resist the takeover, El Paso shareholders tendered
the full 25.1 million shares sought by Burlington. 79
Rather than taking up the shares tendered, Burlington Northern
negotiated a friendly takeover agreement with El Paso management.80
Pursuant to this agreement, Burlington rescinded its original tender of-
fer, replacing it with a new offer of $24 per share for only 21 million
shares."' This second offer generated tenders of over 40 million El
Paso shares.82
Because the number of shares tendered in response to the second
offer far exceeded the 21 million shares Burlington had agreed to
purchase, each tendering shareholder was able to sell only a portion of
his or her shares at the tender offer price.8 3 As a result of this prora-
tion, the shareholders who had tendered in response to the original
tender offer realized a significantly lower return than they would have
if Burlington had bought the 25.1 million shares originally tendered in
accordance with the terms of the first offer.84 One of these original
tenderors brought suit against Burlington, alleging that the withdrawal
of the first tender offer was a "manipulative act" under Section 14(e).85
Acknowledging the division of authority among the circuits on the
elements of Section 14(e) "manipulation,"8 6 the Schreiber court
adopted the Second Circuit's position that misrepresentation is essen-
tial to a Section 14(e) violation.8 7 Because no misrepresentation or
nondisclosure was involved in Burlington's withdrawal of the original
tender offer, the court held that there had been no violation of Section
14(e).88 The court held that the narrow purpose of the Williams Act
77. Id. at 164.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id. at 165.
82. Id.
83. Id When a tender offer is oversubscribed in this manner, the Williams Act requires that
the tender offeror purchase shares on a pro rata basis from all those who have tendered. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1982).
84. 731 F.2d at 165.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 166.
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justified this narrow construction of Section 14(e). 89 Explaining that
the Williams Act is designed to provide disclosure of relevant informa-
tion to investors faced with a tender offer,90 the Court pointed out that
Mobil's extension of Section 14(e) to matters unrelated to disclosure
would embroil the federal courts in disputes over the substantive fair-
ness of tender offers. 91 The court recognized that the resolution of such
disputes was reserved to the states, and refused to follow Mobil's ex-
pansive interpretation of Section 14(e). 92
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION
14(e)
In order to determine the proper role of Section 14(e), it is neces-
sary to analyze the competing interpretations of the provision at three
levels. Initially, an examination of the basic goals of the federal securi-
ties laws facilitates an evaluation of the doctrinal soundness of the con-
flicting constructions of Section 14(e). At the second level of inquiry,
the validity of the arguments in support of each interpretation is as-
sessed in terms of the specific goals of the Williams Act. Finally, the
dispute over the meaning of the term "manipulation" as used in Sec-
tion 14(e) is resolved through a review of previous interpretations of
the term in the context of the securities laws.
A. The Basic Principles and Goals of the Securities Laws
The basic purpose of the federal securities laws is to protect inves-
tors against fraud and to ensure the integrity of the securities markets
through the implementation of a "philosophy of full disclosure" in se-
curities transactions. 93 Although Congress has enacted a comprehen-
sive body of legislation to achieve this goal, the securities laws override
9tate corporate law only to the extent necessary to effect this policy of
disclosure. 94 The disclosure requirements of federal law operate con-
currently with the traditional power of the states to charter corpora-
tions and establish substantive standards of corporate management. 95
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
94. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973).
95. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). There, the Supreme Court held that:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the inter-
nal affairs of the corporation.
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Recently, a series of federal court decisions under the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws seriously eroded the barrier between
the state and federal realms of corporate regulation. Through a broad
interpretation of Section 10(b) 96 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the courts expanded federal law into matters previously thought to be
within the exclusive purview of the states.97 Although Section 10(b) is
designed only to prohibit fraud in the "purchase or sale" of securities, 98
federal courts over a fifteen-year period extended the provision to reach
conduct essentially amounting to corporate mismanagement. 99 Gradu-
ally, the requirement that a Section 10(b) plaintiff be a purchaser or
seller of securities seemed to disappear, as the federal courts took cog-
nizance of complaints which were, in reality, allegations that corporate
directors had engaged in self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty.1°°
Traditionally, such misconduct had been redressed in a state law
action. 1o
Typically, the activity complained of in these suits was a decision
by corporate directors to issue stock to themselves or to majority share-
holders at a price minority shareholders deemed inadequate. 0 2 The
Id at 84.
96. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982). In order to effectuate this prohibition, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5,
which makes it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1984).
97. See Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Pappas v. Moss, 393
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
98. See supra note 96.
99. See cases cited supra note 97.
100. See supra note 97.
101. See Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Act's Anifraud Provi-
sions .4 Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 BOSTON COLL. L. REv. 819 (1979).
102. Corporate directors generally have full discretion as to the issuance of authorized stock.
Absent fraud, their judgment as to the value of consideration received for the stock is deemed
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plaintiffs in such cases were usually minority shareholders claiming
that these self-dealing transactions were fraudulent within the meaning
of Section 10(b).103 Although these plaintiffs were neither purchasers
nor sellers of securities, the courts held that minority shareholders
could sue derivatively under Section 10(b) on behalf of the corporation,
which was held to be the "seller" of the securities for purposes of Sec-
tion 10(b). 104
Even though the circumstances, terms and conditions of the self-
dealing transactions were fully disclosed to those who held the power
within the corporation to approve the sale of stock, deception of minor-
ity shareholders as to these transactions was judicially imputed to the
corporation. 0 5 Thus, a fraudulent sale of securities under Section
10(b) had occurred, despite the lack of deception of those who func-
tioned as the decisionmakers in the sale on behalf of the corporate
"seller.''°6 This use of Section 10(b) seems wholly unrelated to the
federal goal of providing full disclosure for the benefit of those in-
volved in securities transactions. The real wrong which occurred in
these cases was not a fraudulent securities transaction, but a breach of
the state law duty of directors to manage corporations for the benefit of
all shareholders.10 7
Perhaps the most expansive reading of Section 10(b) came in Su-
perintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co.,'08 where the Supreme Court held that a corporation could be
deceived within the meaning of 1Ob-5 even where the sole shareholder
and the lone officer of the corporation were participants in the decep-
conclusive, as is their determination of the proper price at which to issue the stock. ABA-ALI
-MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 16-19 (1980).
103. See 393 F.2d at 866; 405 F.2d at 218.
104. 393 F.2d at 869; 405 F.2d at 219-20.
105. 393 F.2d at 869; 405 F.2d at 219-20. In Pappas, the directors of a corporation issued stock
to themselves at an allegedly deflated price. 393 F.2d at 866. As majority shareholders, the direc-
tors then ratified the issuance. Id. at 867. In Schoenbaum, the directors of a majority-owned
subsidiary voted to issue stock to the parent corporation on the eve of an oil discovery which
increased the value of the subsidiary's stock. 405 F.2d at 218. The minority shareholders alleged
that the price paid by the parent was inadequate, and that the directors knew of the impending oil
discovery at the time they approved the sale. Id
106. 393 F.2d at 869; 405 F.2d at 219-20. The Schoenbaum court held that where a controlling
shareholder extracts a benefit from the corporation at the expense of the minority, and deceives
the minority with regard to such action, the controlling shareholder has violated lOb-5. 405 F.2d
at 219-20. State law traditionally regulated such transactions, imposing on controlling sharehold-
ers a duty to treat minority shareholders fairly in the exercise of corporate powers. See Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460
P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
107. See Zahn, Jones, Singer, supra note 106.
108. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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tion. 109 In Banker's Life, the sole shareholder rigged a sale of securities
by the corporation so as to deprive the corporation of the proceeds of
the sale.t10 Finding that the corporation had been "duped" into believ-
ing that it would receive the proceeds of the sale, the Court held that
creditors injured by this deception had standing under 1Ob-5 to sue
those involved in the scheme."'
The Court based this grant of standing to creditors of the
"deceived" corporation on the fiduciary duty owed by a controlling
shareholder to creditors of the corporation." 12 Acknowledging that this
is a state law duty ordinarily enforced in state courts, the Court held
that a 1Ob-5 action would lie where the breach of duty took the form of
a sale of securities "touched by fraud.""13 Disregarding the fact that
the plaintiff was not defrauded in the actual securities transaction, the
Court held that a lOb-5 claim would be heard in all such cases, regard-
less of the availability of a state law remedy.' 14
The Banker's Life implication that a mere breach of fiduciary duty
creates a cause of action under Section 10(b) led to further incursions
by lower courts into areas of corporate conduct previously governed by
state law." 5 In Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.," 6 the
Second Circuit held that Section 14(e) of the Williams Act incorpo-
rated the common-law tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage.1 7 Therefore, the court allowed a defeated tender offeror to
recover damages from a target company which had thwarted the tender
109. Id. at 9-10.
110. Id.
111. 1d at 12.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Id. at 12-13. The continued validity of this aspect of Bankers Lfe is questionable after
the Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), which is discussed
infra, at notes 129-38 and accompanying text, and in view of the Court's holding in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975) that an implied private right of action under federal law will lie only for
members of the class which the law is especially designed to benefit, and that actions traditionally
relegated to state law will not be impliedly subsumed under federal law. This tends to undermine
the Bankers Life holding that a creditor has an implied right of action under §10(b), a law
designed to protect purchasers and sellers of securities. Similarly inconsistent with Cori is the
Bankers Life disregard of the availability of state law remedies in its consideration of the existence
of a lOb-5 cause of action.
115. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
116. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
117. Id. at 360. While the court's reasoning is unclear on this point, its holding that § 14(e)
establishes a federal cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage seems
to flow from a perception that the Williams Act supersedes all state corporate regulation in tender
offer situations. See id.
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offer." 11
The Second Circuit followed this decision with an even more egre-
gious intrusion into the domain of the states. In Green v. Santa Fe In-
dus., Inc.,t" 9 the court held that neither misrepresentation nor
nondisclosure were essential to a 1Ob-5 claim, and that 1Ob-5 estab-
lished a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.120 The
Green court further held that compliance with applicable state regula-
tions would not satisfy lOb-5, stating that a transaction challenged
under 1Ob-5 must comport with federal standards of fairness. 12'
In Green, a parent corporation which held 95% of the stock of a
subsidiary had merged with the subsidiary in a statutory merger which
enabled the parent to force the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
to sell their stock to the parent for cash.' 22 The state law merger proce-
dure required that the parent pay minority shareholders the judicially-
appraised value of their shares in the event the minority felt the price
offered by the parent was inadequate. 123 Despite compliance with this
state procedure and full disclosure of the terms of the merger to the
minority, the Second Circuit found a lOb-5 violation. 124 The court
held that lob-5 created a federal fiduciary standard which requires that
all corporate transactions serve some "justifiable business purpose" be-
yond the enrichment of the majority shareholders. 125 Finding that the
merger in Green served only to enhance the value of the parent com-
pany's holdings through elimination of the minority shareholders, the
court held that the parent had violated this standard and was therefore
liable under lOb-5.126
After Green, it appeared that a federal regime of corporate govern-
ance had arisen in the form of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b-5). 127
118. Id at 360-61.
119. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
120. Id. at 1291.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1288. Section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law permits a parent corporation
which owns at least 90% of a subsidiary to merge with the subsidiary upon approval by the board
of directors and shareholders of the parent. The consent of the minority shareholders is not re-
quired, and they may be forced to sell their interest in the subsidiary to the parent. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1983).
123. See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 253 (1983).
124. 533 F.2d at 1291.
125. Id The gist of the reasoning for this holding was the court's characterization of a breach
of fiduciary duty as a "fraud" within the meaning of the Rule lob-5 prohibition of the use in
securities transactions of "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud." 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(1)
(1984).
126. 533 F.2d at 1291.
127. Many commentators had noted prior to Green that substantive federal standards of cor-
porate management were emerging under § 10(b). See Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An
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Although the Supreme Court had taken some action to tighten up the
standing requirements under these provisions, 28 the lower courts had
enlarged the substantive scope of the statute to include conduct wholly
unrelated to the "full disclosure" aims of the securities laws.129 Thus,
the stage was set for the Supreme Court's review of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Green.
In Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,'30 the Supreme Court called a
halt to the expansion of securities laws into areas of corporate activity
traditionally regulated by the states.' 3' Emphatically rejecting the Sec-
ond Circuit's contention that Section 10(b) creates federal fiduciary
standards, the Court held that regulation of substantive corporate con-
duct is the exclusive province of state law. 132  The Court held that
where a shareholder alleges that a corporate transaction is unfair, the
claim is of a breach of fiduciary duty, and must be adjudicated under
state law.' 33
The Santa Fe court emphasized that the federal securities laws are
designed only to ensure full and accurate disclosure of information rel-
Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule
10(b)-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Jennings,
Federalization of Corporation Law- Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991 (1976). Perhaps
the most significant article of all on the subject of the efficacy of federal regulation of corporate
management is Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974). Cary argued that the states had grown lax in the protection of shareholders, and that a
federal corporate law was necessary to shield investors from abuses of power by corporate
insiders.
128. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975), the Supreme Court held that only an actual purchaser or seller of securities had standing
to sue under § 10(b). A year later, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425
U.S. 986 (1976), the Court held that a § 10(b) plaintiff must allege "scienter" on the part of the
defendant in order to state a claim. The Court defined "scienter" in the context of § 10(b) as the
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Id. at 193.
129. The Williams Act was not immune to the fever of expansionism sweeping the federal
courts. In Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), decided on the eve of the Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe, § 14(e) was held
to create a federal cause of action for breaches of fiduciary duty relating to a tender offer. Id. at
1158. The court held that, where target directors allegedly breached their fiduciary duties by
depriving shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares to a tender offeror whose bid for
control was thwarted by the target directors' defensive tactics, § 14(e) entitled the tender offeror to
an injunction barring the target directors from culminating a defensive sale of stock. Id at 1161-
62.
130. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
131. Id. at 478-79. The Court held that federal fiduciary standards "would overlap and quite
possibly interfere with state corporate law." Id. at 479.
132. Id at 479. The Court stated, "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden." Id
133. Id at 477.
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evant to securities transactions. 134 Absent misrepresentation or nondis-
closure, an unfair transaction does not violate federal law. 35 Because
neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was alleged in Santa Fe,
the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under Sec-
tion 10(b).1 36
Santa Fe effectively reestablished the boundary between state and
federal corporate regulation, and refocused the securities laws on the
disclosure goals for which they were designed. 137 Since Santa Fe, the
lower courts have confined liability under the securities laws to conduct
involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 38 For the most part, the
courts have heeded the Supreme Court's corollary directive that com-
plaints relating to the substantive fairness of fully disclosed transac-
tions are to be resolved under state law. 139
134. Id. at 478. "The 'fundamental purpose' of the [Securities Exchange] Act [is] implement-
ing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the
terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." Id.
135. Id at 476.
136. Id at 476-77.
137. See Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Act's Antifraud Provi-
sions. A Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 819 (1979); Block &
Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2
CORP. L. REV. 91 (1979); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics-Federal Regulation of Manage-
ment's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (1982).
138. After Santa Fe, federal courts began to dismiss § 10(b) and lOb-5 claims which failed to
allege deception. See, Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977); Nash v. Farmer's
New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Reid v.
Hughes, 578 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1978).
139. See Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F.
Supp. 933 (N.D. 111. 1982). It is interesting to note that Congress has routinely rejected proposed
legislation which would have created federal standards of corporate law. See, S. 2567, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess.; 126 Cong. Rec. S. 3754-57 (Apr. 16, 1980) ("Protection of Shareholder's Rights Act of
1980"); H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. ("The Corporate Democracy Act of 1980") (introduced at
126 Cong. Rec. H2490 (Apr. 2, 1980)). The SEC has been similarly reluctant to regulate the
substantive fairnes of corporate transactions since Santa Fe. The Commission's rule on "going
private transactions" provides a case-in-point. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e (1983). Prior to Santa Fe,
the Commission proposed a rule which would regulate the substantive fairness of transactions in
which a public corporation buys out its public shareholders, or "goes private." See Securities Act
Release No. 5567, 6 SEC Docket 250, 265 (1975); Securities Act Release No. 5884, 13 SEC Docket
839, 851 (1977). In the final version of the rule, adopted subsequent to Santa Fe, the Commission
confined itself to establishing disclosure requirements for such transactions, and deferred to the
states on matters of substantive fairness. Securities Act Release No. 6100, 17 SEC Docket 1449,
1450-51 (1979). For further discussion of the regulation of "going private" transactions, see Silver,
Fair Dealing Comes of Age in the Regulation of Going Private Transactions, 9 1. CORP. L. 385
(1984).
Recently, legislation was introduced which would regulate the substantive conduct of target
directors responding to a tender offer. H.R. Rep. 98-1028 to accompany H.R. 5693 (Report of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce on The Tender Offer Reform Act, Sept. 7, 1984).
This proposed amendment to the Williams Act would have subjected certain target defensive
measures to approval by a majority of the shareholders of the target company. Specifically, the
bill would have required shareholder approval of acquisitions or issuances of stock by a target
board during the pendency of a tender offer. The comments accompanying the bill as reported by
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Santa Fe prompted the lower courts to reassess the nature of the
relationship between the securities laws and state corporate law. 140
Some courts concluded that the disclosure requirements of federal law
should complement state regulation of corporate management.'14 The
Second Circuit applied this theory in Goldberg v. Meridor,42 holding
that a lOb-5 action would lie for nondisclosure of facts which would
entitle shareholders to enjoin a corporate transaction under state
law. 143 Other federal courts have followed this approach to the federal-
state dichotomy, as it seems consistent with the Santa Fe instruction
that federal law seeks only to provide full disclosure of material facts
relating to securities transactions. t44
The lower federal courts quickly comprehended the significance of
Santa Fe in the context of Williams Act litigation. 45  In Altman v.
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce indicated that the proposed restrictions were a
response to a perceived failure of the courts to adequately protect target shareholders against
defensive tactics which are harmful to the target corporation. If this legislation had passed, it
would have represented a significant departure from the traditional doctrine that the relationships
between shareholders and directors are regulated by state law.
However, the 98th Congress adjourned without acting on the bill, and legislators have indi-
cated that it will not be reintroduced. Instead, there will be a comprehensive review of all federal
regulations relating to corporate takeovers. This review will involve hearings lasting through the
fall of this year, making the enactment of revisions of the federal takeover laws unlikely to come
to pass before 1986. 17 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 47 (1/11/85).
140. See, Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denieg 434 U.S. 1069
(1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
141. See, Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 250.
142. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
143. Id. at 219-20.
144. See, Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut.
Cas. Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 820 (1980); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, 616 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir.
1980); but see Madison Consultants v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 710 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir.
1983) (explains that mere existence of state law remedy for the challenged conduct is insufficient;
plaintiff must show he would have succeeded in preventing his loss in the state action); Mayer v.
Oil Field Systems Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 1983). As Hazen points out, this approach
enhances shareholders protection against management abuses by requiring disclosure of facts
which would alert shareholders to a violation of their rights. Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement
and the Federal Securities Act's Antifraud Provisions: .4 Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20
BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 819, 837 (1979). Hazen further explains that the use of federal law to
compel disclosure of facts which amount to violations of state law strengthens rather than in-
fringes state corporate regulation. Id. at 837. Applying this principle to tender offer regulation,
Hazen argues that the proper role of § 14(e) of the Williams Act is to require disclosure of viola-
tions of fiduciary duties and other state laws during a tender offer. Id. at 855. See also Note,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics-Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 633, 652 (1982).
145. See Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Billard v. Rockwell International Corp.,
683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp.
933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Citing Santa Fe, the Second Circuit in Billard held that "the fairness of the
offering price is not a valid basis for an action under Sections 10(b) and 14(e)..." 683 F.2d at 56.
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Knight, '46 the Southern District of New York held that, after Santa Fe,
the Williams Act requires no more than full disclosure by the parties to
a tender offer.' 47 The court found that the substantive fairness of the
actions of the parties is beyond the scope of the Act.' 48 Therefore,
allegations that fully disclosed target defensive tactics were unfair to
target shareholders were cognizable only under state law.' 49
The Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,1o implicitly af-
firmed this application of Santa Fe to the Williams Act, overturning an
Illinois tender offer law.' 5 ' The infirmity of the Illinois law was its pro-
vision for state scrutiny of the fairness of the terms of a tender offer.' 52
Holding that the Williams Act is solely a disclosure statute, uncon-
cerned with the fairness of tender offers, the Court held that the Illinois
policy of "investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy" was
inconsistent with the purposes of the Williams Act. 153
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the Sixth Circuit's invoca-
tion of Section 14(e) in Mobil as a mandate for federal redress of the
perceived unfairness of tender offer defensive tactics contravenes basic
precepts of securities law. Santa Fe commands that federal courts defer
to state law on issues of substantive fairness in corporate transac-
tions.154 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit's assertion that a Section 14(e)
breach can occur without misrepresentation or nondisclosure flies in
the face of the Supreme Court's holding that the securities laws are
satisfied upon full and fair disclosure of information relevant to an in-
vestor's decision on a securities transaction. 55
Although the Mobil court acknowledged that Santa Fe placed
claims of unfairness and breach of fiduciary duty beyond the scope of
the securities laws, 156 it disposed of the issue with a conclusory state-
ment that the plaintiff had alleged more than a fiduciary breach.' 57
This bald assertion failed to address the salient inquiry under Santa Fe.
Santa Fe points out that complaints of unfairness in a corporate trans-
146. 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
147. Id at 314.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
151. Id at 639.
152. Id
153. Id at 640.
154. 430 U.S. at 477.
155. Id at 477-78.
156. 669 F.2d at 374.
157. Id
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action are actually claims of breach of fiduciary duties. 58 Therefore, a
conclusion that a complaint alleges more than a fiduciary breach de-
pends on an initial finding that the complaint is based on something
more than the asserted unfairness of the transaction. 1.9 Santa Fe estab-
lishes that this "something more" is deception, i.e., misrepresentation
or nondisclosure. 60
Although the Sixth Circuit court never divulged precisely what the
Mobil complaint did allege, the facts reveal that there was no misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure regarding the challenged "lock-up op-
tions." 161 Indeed, the sole basis for the court's dissatisfaction with the
options was its perception that they were unfair to the Marathon share-
holders.162 Clearly, the deception essential to a federal cause of action
was absent in Mobil.
The desire to avoid further exposure to the principles of Santa Fe
would seem to explain the Sixth Circuit's decision to heap all the liabil-
ity for the Section 14(e) violation on U.S. Steel. 163 In dealing with the
argument that Santa Fe bars federal adjudication of fiduciary duty
claims, the court stated that more than a fiduciary breach had been
alleged, and accepted the lower court's determination that the Mara-
thon directors had not breached their fiduciary duties. 64 The court
then examined the impact of the options on Marathon shareholders,
and found a violation of Section 14(e).' 65 The court apparently felt
that its exoneration of the Marathon directors on the fiduciary duty
count, precluded it from holding them liable for the Section 14(e) viola-
tion. 66 This left the court no choice but to pin the violation on U.S.
Steel, whom the court excoriated for presenting the Marathon directors
with a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition which conditioned the U.S.
Steel tender offer on the grant of the options. 167 The court held that the
Section 14(e) violation lay in U.S. steel's "demand" for the options, and
158. See 430 U.S. at 477.
159. See id. at 476-77.
160. Id.
161. See 669 F.2d at 376.
162. Id. at 377.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id
166. The court indicated some displeasure with U.S. Steel's presentation of the options as part
of a "take-it-or-leave it" proposal to the Marathon directors during the negotiations which led to
U.S. Steel's tender offer. Id Nevertheless, the facts do not support a conclusion that U.S. Steel
occupied a position of dominance in relation to the Marathon directors such as would have ena-
bled it to coerce Marathon into granting the options.
167. Id.
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not in the grant of the options by Marathon's directors. 168 This confus-
ing resolution ignores the logical inconsistency of holding the benefici-
ary of an illegal act fully liable, while exculpating the party who
voluntarily performed the act.
The Second and Third Circuits have recognized that Mobil disre-
gards the fundamental principle that the securities laws are concerned
not with the substantive fairness of corporate transactions, but with full
disclosure of all facts relevant to those transactions. 69 Buffalo Forge
and Schreiber correctly interpret Santa Fe as a bar to federal judicial
scrutiny of the fairness of tender offer strategies. 170 The refusal of these
courts to invalidate fully disclosed transactions comports with basic
disclosure goal of the securities laws, and preserves the balance be-
tween state and federal law in the field of corporate regulation.
Under the Buffalo Forge-Schreiber analysis, there is room for a
holding that concealment of facts constituting a breach of a state law
fiduciary duty would violate Section 14(e). Such a holding would com-
port with the complementary relationship between federal securities
regulation and state corporate law. 17 Furthermore, requiring that di-
rectors disclose actions which may constitute violations of state law
would maximize shareholder protection in tender offer situations.
Once advised that directors have violated state law, shareholders would
be able to seek redress of the violation in state court.
B. The Purpose of the Williams Act
The Williams Act was Congress' response to the dramatic increase
in tender offer activity in the mid-1960's. 7 2 The Act contains several
specific disclosure and timing requirements 73 and, in 14(e), a broad
antifraud provision. 74 Section 14(e) prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative" conduct by anyone in connection with a tender of-
168. Id
169. See Buffalo Forge v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550
(1984); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3204 (1984).
170. 717 F.2d at 760; 731 F.2d at 166.
171. See notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
172. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEWs 2811. The House Report of the bill which became the Williams Act indicates that the Act
was a response to "[t]he increased use of cash tender offers to acquire control of corporations,
[which] is evidenced by the fact that in 1966 there were over 100 such offers involving companies
listed on the national securities exchanges, as compared with eight in 1960." Id. at 2812.
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (f) (1982).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
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fer. 175 Unfortunately, the Act does not define these terms, and the Se-
curities Exchange Commission has yet to exercise the power given to it
by the 1970 amendment to Section 14(e) 176 to define such acts as are
"manipulative" under the Act. An examination of the purpose of the
Williams Act, as expressed in the legislative history, provides a context
in which to determine the proper scope of Section 14(e).
The record of congressional debate on the Williams Act shows that
the impetus for the legislation was Congress' concern 77 that tender of-
fers were not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Act of 1934.178 The author of the bill, Senator Thomas Harrison Wil-
liams, declared that the "essential problem" with the emergence of the
tender offer as the primary corporate takeover mechanism was the abil-
ity of offerors "to operate in almost complete secrecy concerning their
intentions, their commitments and even their identities."'' 79 To under-
score the necessity of disclosure in tender offers, the cosponsor of the
bill, Senator Thomas Kuchel, recounted for his colleagues the near-
takeover of Columbia Motion Pictures through a tender offer which
concealed the identity of the persons behind the offer. 80 Kuchel
warned that the absence of disclosure requirements for tender offers
allowed "takeover pirates" to acquire corporations without disclosing
so much as their identities, let alone their plans to loot the companies
once in control.' 8'
Further legislative comment indicates that Congress' sole intention
in passing the bill was to eliminate this blind spot in the disclosure
175. Id
176. Pub. L. 91-567 §§ 3-5; 84 Stat. 1497 (Dec. 22, 1970).
177. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2811. The report points out that there are significant advantages in seeking control of a
company by the cash tender offer:
One such advantage is that by using a cash tender offer the person seeking control
can operate in almost complete secrecy. At present, the law does not even require that he
disclose his identity, the source of his funds, who his associates are, or what he intends to
do if he gains control of the corporation. As a practical matter, unless incumbent man-
agement explains its position publicly, the investor is severely limited in obtaining all the
facts on which to base a decision whether to accept or reject a tender offer.
Id at 2812.
178. 48 Stat. 891 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78
(1982)).
179. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (daily ed. July 18, 1967).
180. Id. at 857. Senator Kuchel cautioned that:
Today there are those individuals in our financial community who seek to reduce
our proudest businesses into nothing but corporate shells. They seize control of the cor-
poration with unknown sources, sell or trade away the best assets, and later split up the
remains among themselves. The tragedy of such collusion is that the corporation can be
financially raped without management or shareholders having any knowledge of the ac-
quisitions. Id.
181. Id. at 855.
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requirements of the securities laws. 18 2 Introducing the bill, Williams
stated, "this legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection
under the federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of perti-
nent information to stockholders when persons seek to obtain control
of a corporation by a cash tender offer." 83 Williams explained that the
bill was designed to subject tender offers to the same disclosure require-
ments the existing laws imposed on other stock transactions.18 4
The narrowness of the intended purpose of the Act is evident in
Williams' statements upon the report of the bill by the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee. 85 He declared that the bill was "designed
solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."' 186
Williams went on to detail the disclosure requirements which ulti-
mately became law under the Act. 187 Nowhere in the comments of
Williams or others is there evidence of an intent that the Act achieve
any purpose beyond ensuring full disclosure to stockholders of all in-
formation relevant to their decision of whether to accept or reject a
tender offer.
Although most of the legislative commentary on the bill is of a
general nature, the House Report articulates the specific aim of Section
14(e).' 88 The report says that Section 14(e) affirms that "persons en-
gaged in making or opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to in-
fluence the decision of investors or the outcome of the tender offer are
under an obligation to make a full disclosure of material information to
those with whom they deal."' 8 9 This comment evinces an intention to
restrict Section 14(e) to a field of operation bounded by the limited
purpose of the Act as a whole. Specifically, the comment indicates that
182. See id. at 854-55. Senator Williams stated that "The purpose of this bill is to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." Id.
183. Id. at 854.
184. Id at 855.
185. See generally id. at 24,664 (August 30, 1967).
186. Id.
187. Id. Williams said that the bil! would require tender offerors to disclose:
The size of the holdings of the person or group involved.
The source of the funds to be used to acquire the shares except where the funds are
acquired from a bank in the ordinary course of business.
Any financing arrangements made for these funds and how these arrangements will
be liquidated.
The plants of the offeror-if he wins control of the company-whether to liquidate
it, sell its assets, merge it with another company, or to make major changes in its business
or corporate structure.
Id.
188. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2811, 2821.
189. Id.
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the purpose of Section 14(e) is to require disclosure by those partici-
pants in tender offer battles whose activities might not be reached by
the other provisions of the Act. Neither the House Report, nor any
other legislative comments reveal any intent that Section 14(e) be used
to effect any policy beyond the general disclosure goals of the Act as a
whole.
The passages cited above are but a sampling of the congressional
comment on the Williams Act. The rest of the proceedings demon-
strate virtual unanimity of understanding by the legislators that the sole
purpose of the Act is to require full disclosure in connection with
tender offers. The viewpoint that the Williams Act is more than a dis-
closure statute and that Section 14(e) is a tool for judicial regulation of
tender offer competition finds no support in the legislative history of
the Act.
The legislative history overwhelmingly supports the Buffalo Forge
and Schreiber interpretations of the purpose of the Act. The clearly
expressed intention of the framers of the Act was to require full disclo-
sure in tender offer contests, and nothing more. Nothing in the legisla-
tive history supports the Mobil assertion that the Act is designed to
regulate competition among tender offerors and establish standards of
substantive fairness for transactions connected with tender offers.
Although the Supreme Court's first direct consideration of the ne-
cessity of deception to a Section 14(e) claim will come in Schreiber, °90
the Court has addressed the general purpose of the Williams Act in a
number of previous decisions.' 9 ' In these cases, the Court has consist-
ently maintained that the Act is solely a disclosure statute.' 92 In Pper
v. Chris-Craft Industries,'93 for example, the Court construed the Wil-
liams Act as "a disclosure mechanism aimed especially at protecting
shareholders of target corporations."' 94 The recent decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,' 95 reaffirms the Court's stance that the Act is designed
190. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted 53 U.S.L.W. 3204 (Oct. 2, 1984), arguedJanu-
ary 9, 1985.
191. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.
Inc., 430 U.S. I, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
192. In Rondeau, the Court summarized the purpose of the Act, holding:
The purpose of the Williams Act is to ensure that public shareholders who are con-
fronted with a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without
adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party.
422 U.S. at 58.
193. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
194. Id at 39.
195. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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only to require full disclosure by tender offer participants. 196 With the
exception of the Sixth Circuit, the lower courts have been uniformly
faithful to the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the Act.197
As the previous section explained, the Santa Fe holding that the
securities laws are unconcerned with the substantive fairness of corpo-
rate transactions is fully applicable to the Williams Act. 198 Neverthe-
less, Mobil enjoined lock-up options under Section 14(e) on the basis of
the court's dissatisfaction with the fairness of the options to Marathon
shareholders. 199 Such a result is irreconcilable with the rule of Santa
Fe reserving fairness issues to state law.
The Mobil claim that the Williams Act is intended to assure each
competing tender offeror equal footing in the struggle for control of the
target is similarly inconsistent with previous interpretations of the
Act. 2°° As the Buffalo Forge court pointed out,20 1 the Supreme Court
in Piter v. Chris-Craft Industries20 2 held that "tender offerors were not
the intended beneficiaries of the bill. .. 203 The Piper Court denied a
defeated tender offeror standing to seek damages under Section 14(e)
for harm allegedly suffered as a result of the tactics used by the victor
during the battle for the target. 2°4
Another discussion of the applicability of Section 14(e) to target
actions which confer an advantage on a "friendly" tender offeror is
found in Billard v. Rockwell International Corp.205 There, a share-
holder mounted a Section 14(e) challenge to agreements which virtu-
196. Id. at 633.
197. See Swanson v. Wabash, 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (N.D. II1. 1983) (express rejection of
Mobil); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984) (Second Circuit following its decision in Buffalo Forge); Atchley v. Qonaar
Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623,
628 (D. Md. 1982); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (N.D. Tex.
1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319-21 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
198. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
199. See 669 F.2d at 376-77.
200. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. I, reh'g denied 430 U.S. 976 (1977); Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Billard v.
Rockwell International Corp., 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982).
201. 717 F.2d at 760.
202. 430 U.S. 1, reh'g denied 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
203. Id at 28. The Court held that the Williams Act was enacted solely for the protection of
shareholders of target corporations. From this the Court concluded that a defeated tender offeror
did not have standing under § 14(e) to sue a victorious adversary. Id at 35-36. Although beyond
the scope of this article, it is interesting to note the Mobilcourt's rationale for granting standing to
Mobil. See Mobil, 669 F.2d at 370-73. The Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge avoided the standing
question by the unusual procedure of first disposing of the merits of the § 14(e) claim, and then
holding that the determination on the merits rendered consideration of the standing issue unneces-
sary. See 717 F.2d at 760-61.
204. Piper, 430 U.S. at 28.
205. 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ally assured the success of a tender offeror favored by target
management. 2°6 The Second Circuit held that allegations that the
agreements deterred possible competing tender offers failed to state an
actionable claim under Section 14(e). 20 7 The Seventh Circuit in Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co.,20 8 rejected a similar challenge to actions of
target directors.20 9 The Panter court refused to invalidate target defen-
sive tactics, holding that the tendency of the tactics to make a particular
offeror's bid for control more difficult did not constitute a Section 14(e)
violation.210 These cases demonstrate that the Mobil court's concern
for the impact of the U.S. Steel options on other tender offerors'
chances of success 2 1 was not a proper consideration under the Wil-
liams Act.
The import of the foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts addressing the purpose of the Williams Act was
apparently lost on the Mobil court. Mobil acknowledged only Santa Fe
in its consideration of the defendants' argument that the Act requires
no more than full disclosure. 212 The court dismissed this defense with
the perfunctory retort that "the defendants read too much into ..."
the Santa Fe holding that the securities laws are concerned solely with
"implementing a philosophy of full disclosure. ' 21 3
More disturbing than Mobil's cursory treatment of Santa Fe is its
complete disregard of the Supreme Court's explicit articulations of the
purpose of the Williams Act in Poer and in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp.214 These two decisions unequivocally deny the Williams Act any
function beyond the monitoring of disclosure in tender offer contests. 215
Had the Sixth Circuit given these cases due consideration, it could not
ingenuously have concluded that fully disclosed lock-up options violate
the Williams Act.
206. Id at 55. The challenged agreements gave a tender offeror which already held a majority
of the target's stock control of the target board of directors. Id.
207. Id.
208. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
209. Id at 288. The Seventh Circuit upheld the validity under § 14(e) of acquisitions and
antitrust litigation designed to thwart a tender offeror's bid for control. Id
210. Id.
211. See669 F.2d at 377.
212. Id. at 376.
213. Id.
214. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31, reh'g denied 430 U.S. 976 (1977);
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
215. In Piper, the Supreme Court held that the Williams Act "was designed solely to get
needed information to the investor." 430 U.S. at 31. Rondeau holds that the purpose of the Act is
to assure shareholders "adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the
offering party." 422 U.S. at 58.
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The Buffalo Forge court, on the other hand, understood that Piper
and Rondeau were controlling authority on the purpose of the Williams
Act.216 The Second Circuit's refusal to use Section 14(e) to vitiate a
fully disclosed lock-up agreement represented a return to the previ-
ously undisputed construction of the Williams Act as a pure disclosure
statute unconcerned with the substantive fairness of tender offers. 217
The Schreiber court's refusal to entertain under Section 14(e) a claim
arising out of fully disclosed conduct 2'8 is similarly consistent with the
purpose of the Act. Both courts wisely declined to follow Mobi, 2 19
which the Second Circuit succinctly termed an "unwarranted extension
of the Williams Act. 220
C. The Meaning of "'Manpulation" Under Section 14(e)
The genesis of the dispute between the Courts of Appeals on the
interpretation of Section 14(e) is in the failure of Congress to provide a
statutory definition of the term "manipulative acts." Neither the Wil-
liams Act nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 include such a defi-
nition, though both proscribe such activities. 221 It has thus been left to
the courts to identify the elements of the prohibited "manipulation."
The Supreme Court has recognized that the term "manipulative"
is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities mar-
kets. ' 222 The Court's most thorough analysis of the meaning of "ma-
nipulation" came in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,223 where the meaning
of the term as used in Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was at issue.224
Reiterating that "manipulation" has a special meaning in the securities
context,225 the Court stated that the term refers generally to practices
"such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended
(o mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity. '226 The
Court held that there could be no violation of Section 10(b) "without
any deception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure .. 227
216. 717 F.2d at 760.
217. Id
218. 731 F.2d at 166.
219. 717 F.2d at 760, 731 F.2d at 166.
220. 717 F.2d at 760.
221. See Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
222. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199, reh'g denieg 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (con-
struing "manipulation" as used in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
223. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 476.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court has yet to define "manipulation"
under Section 14(e), the lower courts have held that the Santa Fe defi-
nition of Section 10(b) "manipulation" is applicable to Section 14(e).228
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 229 the Seventh Circuit held that Sec-
tion 10(b) and Section 14(e) are coextensive antifraud provisions, and
are therefore to be considered in pari materia.230 Proceeding on this
basis, the court determined that the Santa Fe requirement of misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure is applicable to Section 14(e). 231
The Santa Fe decision alone is solid support for the Buffalo Forge
holding that "[a]n essential ingredient of a section 14(e) cause of action
is misrepresentation, i.e., the omission or misstatement of material
facts. ' 232 The determinations of other federal courts that the Santa Fe
definition of "manipulation" applies to Section 14(e) further buttress
the Buffalo Forge interpretation of the term. The same precedent un-
dermines the Mobil claim that Section 14(e) "manipulation" can occur
in the absence of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 233
In constructing a rationale for its decision, the Mobil court under-
standably avoided the passage in Santa Fe in which the Court held that
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is necessary to "manipulative con-
duct." Instead, the Sixth Circuit relied on statements in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder234 and Santa Fe to the effect that "manipulation" meant
tactics which "artificially affect" stock prices. 235 The court based its
228. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman v.
Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
229. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
230. Id at 282.
231. Id. at 283. For other cases holding that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a required
element of a § 14(e) violation, see Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1983);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982); Lewis v. McGraw,
619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F.
Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper, 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
232. 717 F.2d at 760.
233. 669 F.2d at 376.
234. 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
235. 669 F.2d at 374. The Sixth Circuit cited the following passages in support of its position:
Use of the word manipulative is especially significant. It is and was virtually a term
of art when used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities.
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
Manipulation is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities
markets." Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199. The term refers generally to practices, such as
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity.
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. These two passages clearly indicate that the Supreme Court defines
"manipulation" in the securities context as conduct involving some element of fraud or deception.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
holding that neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure is an essential
element of Section 14(e) "manipulation" on Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin,236 a
case interpreting the meaning of "manipulation" in the context of com-
modities futures trading.237
The Sixth Circuit's attempt to base its holding on the "artificial
effect" theory of "manipulation" is untenable for three reasons. First,
the court ignored language in the very passages it cites from Ernst and
Santa Fe which explains that the term "manipulation" contemplates
conduct intended to "artificially affect" stock prices by deceiving or mis-
leading investors as to the true value of the securities.238 The grant of
the options to U.S. Steel served not to mislead investors as to the value
of Marathon stock, but to elicit a tender offer for that stock at a price
$40 per share higher than the Mobil offer.
Second, Mobil's reliance on Cargill is totally misplaced. Ernst, as
Mobil itself points out,239 establishes that "manipulation" is a "term of
art when used in connection with securities markets. ' 240 Given this
specialized use of the term, the interpretation of "manipulation" in
Cargill, a commodities case, is irrelevant to the meaning of the term as
used in the securities laws.241
Finally, the tactics described as "manipulative" in Ernst and Santa
Fe are only those which artificially affect "market activity. ' 242 The
Court in these cases was referring only to activities in the stock market
which create the illusion of demand for a particular stock.243  There
The examples of "manipulative devices" given in Santa Fe are all deceptive stock trading devices.
This indicates that "manipulative" activities are conduct in the stock market which creates a false
impression as to the value of a stock. A lock-up agreement between a target company and a
"White Knight" creates no such false impression as to the value of the target stock.
236. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
237. Id at 1163.
238. See supra, note 233.
239. 669 F.2d at 374.
240. 425 U.S. at 199.
241. Cargill provides an excellent description of the functioning of the commodities future
exchanges, and explains that the purpose of federal regulation of these exchanges is to assure
farmers an adequate price for their produce, thereby protecting consumers against food shortages.
Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-63. The federal securities laws differ from the commodities laws in that
they seek not to regulate securities prices, but to ensure the integrity of the securities markets
through the prevention of fraud. Therefore, the meaning of the term "manipulation" in securities
law is completely unrelated to its meaning in commodities law.
242. The "wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices" cited in Santa Fe as "manipulative"
are all tactics employed in the stock market to create the illusion of trading activity in a stock.
243. See Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979), in
which the court, after examining the legislative history and Supreme Court interpretations of the
term, concluded that "manipulation" means: "practices in the market place which have the effect
of either creating the false impression that certain market activity is occurring when in fact such
activity is unrelated to actual supply and demand or tampering with the price itself. I d. at
1360.
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was no stock market activity involved in the grant of the options by
Marathon to U.S. Steel, and it created no unfounded illusions as to the
demand for or value of Marathon stock. Therefore, the options were
not "manipulative" acts under Section 14(e).
D. Practical Effects of Mobil and Buffalo Forge on Tender Offer
Defensive Tactics
Buffalo Forge represents the inevitable culmination of widespread
judicial discomfort with the potentially far-reaching implications of
Mobil.2 "4 The Second Circuit's decision reaffirms the prevailing judi-
cial consensus that the Williams Act is solely a disclosure statute, and
marks a return to application of the Act in a manner consistent with
that purpose. Moreover, Buffalo Forge helps to reestablish the bound-
ary between state and federal areas of corporate regulation by adhering
to the Santa Fe command that complaints relating to the substantive
fairness of transactions are to be dealt with under the applicable state
law of fiduciary duties.
The Second Circuit's unequivocal holding that the Williams Act
requires only full disclosure establishes a clear standard for compliance
with Section 14(e). The decision assures corporate directors that de-
fenses to tender offers are valid under federal law as long as they are
fully disclosed. Furthermore, the Second Circuit makes it clear that the
standards of substantive fairness to which defense tactics must conform
are those established by state law.
The well-defined standard for compliance emerging from Buffalo
Forge is a welcome contrast to the uncertainty wrought by Mobil. The
Sixth Circuit's holding would allow the invalidation of target responses
to tender offers merely because a particular judge feels the transaction
is unfair. This open-ended judicial license would make the imposition
of Section 14(e) liability entirely unpredictable and dependent on the
predilections of individual judges. Such a capricious standard would
undermine the well-established norms of directorial conduct embodied
244. The trepidation with which Mobil was received is evident in the first cases dealing with
claims based on the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of § 14(e). Initially, courts sought either to avoid
the § 14(e) issue altogether, or to factually distinguish their cases from Mobil. See Cities Service
Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 541 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Del., 1982); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F.
Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). This trepidation soon blossomed into outright hostility, as courts
began to reject Mobil-based arguments that § 14(e) can be violated in the absence of misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure. See Marshall Field & Co., v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197 (D. Del. 1983); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308
(N.D. Ill. 1983). Only the Ninth Circuit has endorsed the Mobil view of § 14(e). See Pacific
Realty v. APC Investments, Inc., 685 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1982).
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in the fiduciary duties established by state law.245
Although the Sixth Circuit did not premise its Mobil ruling on the
inadequacy of state law remedies, some commentators attempt to jus-
tify Mobil as the necessary response to an asserted failure of state courts
to protect public shareholders from abuses of corporate power by direc-
tors seeking to stave off tender offers.246 This argument is based on the
perception that the interest of target directors in preserving their power
will preclude them from exercising objective business judgment in de-
termining the proper response to a tender offer which threatens that
power.247 It is argued that this conflict of interest renders the business
judgment rule inapplicable to the decisions of target directors to under-
take defensive measures against a tender offer.248 This argument is fu-
eled by the hesitancy of some courts applying the business judgment
rule in tender offer cases to thoroughly examine the fairness of defen-
sive tactics to target shareholders. 249
245. State law imposes on directors duties of care and loyalty to the corporations they manage.
The duty of care requires that directors exercise the same degree of care in the discharge of their
corporate duties as a resasonable person would employ in the management of personal affairs.
The duty of loyalty bars a director from competing with their corporations, appropriating oppor-
tunities which rightfully belong to their corporations, and from entering transactions in which
their interests unfairly conflict with those of their corporations. If a court finds that a director has
complied with these duties, the business judgment rule bars further judicial scrutiny of the direc-
tors conduct. HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESs ENTER-
PRISES, 621-63 (3d ed. 1983).
246. See Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition
Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of De-
fensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Comment, Target Defensive
Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 228 (1984).
247. It is true that the interest of a corporate director in keeping his job will often diverge with
the interest of a shareholder in maximizing the return on his investment. See Harrington, If it
Ain't Broke, Don't Fix it: The Legal Propriety ofDefenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYR.
L. REV. 977, 989 (1983); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests
for Corporate Control, 76 N.W.U.L. REV. 980 (1982); Comment, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics
and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 621, 652 (1983).
248. See Weiss, supra note 244, Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 244. Other commentators,
while not advocating the use of § 14(e) to remedy unfair tender offer dealings, agree that the
business judgment rule has been misapplied in the tender offer context. See Harrington, Ifit Ain't
Broke, Don't Fix it." The Legal Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYR. L. REV.
977 (1983). Professor Harrington points out that the business judgment rule applies only to trans-
actions in which the directors have no personal interest. Id at 1021. This prerequisite of disinter-
estedness, according to Harrington, is not met in corporate takeover situations because the actions
of the target directors are tainted by their interest in preserving their jobs. Id. at 1021-22. Har-
rington would deny the protections of the business judgment rule to target directors in takeover
situations, and require that they prove that actions which served to maintain their control were
intended primarily to serve the interests of the corporation, and were fair to the shareholders. Id.
at 989, 1022-23. See also, Comment, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment
Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 621, 655-57 (1983); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judg-
ment Rule in Contests for Corporate Control, 76 N.W.U.L. REV. 980 (1982).
249. See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Il. 1982); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del.
WILLIAMS A CT
Contrary to the urgings of those who would abandon state law in
tender offer jurisprudence, courts applying state fiduciary standards
have begun to recognize the inherent conflict of interest of a corporate
director faced with a threat to his or her position and power.250 Deci-
sions under state law have uniformly held that a director's use of cor-
porate resources and power for the sole purpose of perpetuating or
preserving his or her control of the corporation is a breach of fiduciary
duty.25' Although the standards by which the various states will evalu-
ate the defensive tactics employed by target directors in tender offer
battles are still evolving, recent cases have subjected the conduct of di-
rectors in transactions affecting corporate control to more rigorous
examination.252
An example of the increased vigilance of the state courts on behalf
of shareholders is Singer v. Magnavox Co. 253 There, the Delaware
1964). A recent decision of the Delaware Supreme Court demonstrates that the mere recitation of
the business judgment rule does not necessarily afford directors talismanic protection from judi-
cial scrutiny. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del. Sup. Ct. Slip. Op. No. 255 (Jan. 29, 1985). There,
the court denied the protections of the business judgment rule to a board decision to agree to a
takeover of the corporation. Id. at p.63. The court based this denial on the failure of the directors
to adequately inform themselves of all material information before consenting to the takeover. Id.
250. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981); Northwest Indus.,
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. 111. 1969); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
251. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967) (issuance of
stock to friendly party for sole purpose of defeating tender offer held to breach fiduciary duty);
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (repurchase of
stock for sole purpose of maintaining control of corporation is improper); Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del.
1981).
252. Originally, actions of directors in resistance to a takeover were sheltered by the business
judgment rule unless the plaintiff could show that the "sole" or "primary" purpose of the direc-
tors' acts was to maintain control. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d at 554, Northwest Indus., Inc. v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. 111. 1969); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp.
933, 950 (N.D. 111. 1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Another line of cases requires that the directors prove that transactions
enhancing their control of the corporation were entered for valid business reasons. See Bennett v.
Propp, 187 A.2d at 409; Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d at 382; Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. at 305.
In practice, directors were able to satisfy these standards with little more than a recitation of some
plausible business reason for actions clearly intended to avert a takeover. See Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law.- Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Some recent cases,
however, have imposed a higher standard, requiring that directors show more than an arguable
business reason for transactions which preserve their positions. These cases demand that directors
prove the "entire fairness" of such transactions to the corporation and its shareholders. See Klaus
v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del.
1977); Tanzer v. International General Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); but see Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch.
1979) (holding that fiduciary duty of majority shareholders to minority is not as great in connec-
tion with tender offer by majority for minority's stock as it is in "cash-out" merger where minority
is legally compelled to sell out).
253. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). This case was decided in the wake of the Supreme Court's
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Supreme Court announced that, where directors are interested in a
transaction affecting corporate control, the directors will have to estab-
lish the "entire fairness" of the transaction to all shareholders. 25 4 Ap-
plied to tender offer defenses, such a standard would prevent tactics
which entrench incumbent management at the expense of shareholders,
while freeing directors to resist tender offers which are inimical to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.25 5 This flexible, com-
prehensive standard is preferable to Mobil's blanket prohibition of all
tactics which tend to deter a particular tender offer.
The recent application of New York law by the Second Circuit in
Norin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc. 256 provides further evidence of the
capacity of state law to protect shareholders in a takeover dispute. At
issue in Norlin was the legality of the use of an employee stock owner-
ship plan as a method of averting an impending takeover.257 After the
purchase of blocks of Norlin stock by a group apparently poised to
launch an attempt to acquire control of the company, the Norlin board
established an employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP"), and trans-
ferred a large number of authorized but unissued Norlin shares to the
ESOP.258 The effect of this transaction was to insulate the shares issued
to the ESOP from acquistion by the takeover bidder. 259
The Norlin directors sought to preclude judicial scrutiny of the
ESOP tactic by interposing the business judgment rule. 260 The Second
Circuit responded that state law imposes on corporate directors both a
duty of care and a duty of loyalty, and held that the business judgment
rule applies only where the duty of care is at issue.26' The court stated
that a challenge to a transaction in which directors have a personal
interest implicates the duty of loyalty, which requires that the directors
prove that "the transaction is fair and serves the best interests of the
corporation. ' 262 The Second Circuit recognized that directors con-
pronouncement in Santa Fe that the substantive fairness of corporate transactions is to be regu-
lated by the states, and indicates that Delaware intends to provide more effective protection to
shareholders in this area.
254. Id. at 980.
255. The courts agree that corporate directors have a duty to resist takeovers which would be
detrimental to their corporations and shareholders. See infra text accompanying notes 271-78.
256. 744 F.2d 255 (2d. cir. 1984).
257. Id. at 258.
258. Id. The directors retained voting control over the stock issued to the ESOP. Id. at 259.
After the issuance of stock to the ESOP, which gave no real consideration for the shares, the
directors controlled 49% of the outstanding stock of Norlin. Id.
259. Id. at 258.
260. Id. at 264.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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fronted with a potential takeover are personally interested in transac-
tions which serve to solidify their control, and held that the duty of
loyalty sets the standard for judicial review of such transactions.263 Be-
cause the transfer of stock to the ESOP served to solidify the Norlin
Board's control, the burden shifted to the directors to prove that the
transaction comported with the duty of loyalty. 264
The court held that the duty of loyalty required that the Norlin
directors show that the ESOP was "fair and serve[d] the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. ' 265 Because the directors did
not prove that the ESOP served any purpose other than the perpetua-
tion of their control, the court found that the directors failed to meet
this burden.266 Accordingly, the court enjoined the Norlin board from
voting the ESOP stock. 267
The Norlin analysis is a cogent demonstration of the viability of
state fiduciary standards as safeguards for shareholders involved in a
takeover. This standard would protect shareholders from abuses of
power by target directors, while allowing directors to use proper meth-
ods to resist harmful takeovers. Such an approach is clearly preferable
to the virtually standardless review propounded by Mobil.
The broad language of Mobil raised fears in many that all defenses
to tender offers could be outlawed under the Williams Act.268 Recog-
263. Id. at 265
264. In holding that the burden of proving the fairness of the ESOP properly fell on the direc-
tors, the court held that considerations relevant to a target board's determination that a particular
takeover would be harmful to the corporation do not justify all the tactics employed to defeat that
takeover. Id. at 267. Accordingly, the court rejected the boards' contention that, once it had
determined that the takeover would hurt Norlin, all actions it deemed necessary to avert the take-
over were permissible. Id. at 265-66. Similarly, the court held that matters such as the takeover
bidder's reputation for rapacity and the board's fear that the takeover would hurt one of Norlin's
businesses and jeopardize a valuable tax loss carryforward, while germane to the validity of the
board's decision to oppose the takeover as a general proposition, were irrelevant to the propriety
of the decision to employ the ESOP tactic. Id. at 267.
265. Id. at 266.
266. Id. The court emphasized that a board of directors may not use corporate resources for
the sole purpose of entrenching themselves in their positions. Under the duty of loyalty analysis,
directors must show that transactions which serve to solidify their control have a legitimate pur-
pose beyond that effect. Observing that the ESOP had the effect of enhancing the directors' con-
trol, the court held that the establishment of the ESOP would be permissible only if it also
furthered the legitimate purpose of benefitting employees. Id.
267. Id. at 267. Another interesting recent state decision which deals directly with the propri-
ety of lock-up options is Thompson v. Enstar, Civil Action #7641 (Del. Ct. Chan.) (Slip op.
6/20/84). There, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized that lock-ups often deprive share-
holders of the benefits of open bidding by competing takeover candidates, and often infringe the
voting rights of shareholders. Id. at p.6. The court held that these effects warrant careful judicial
scrutiny of lock-ups in order to ensure that "under all the facts and circumstances existing in a
particular case they are fair to the shareholders." Id.
268. See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law be Mobilized to
Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 356 (1983).
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nizing the likelihood that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Section
14(e) would hamstring target directors, courts269 and commentators270
alike have criticized Mobil as an unprecedented judicial intrusion into
corporate decision-making. The possibility that Section 14(e) liability
would attach to any action which a judge feels is unfair to shareholders
or competing tender offerors would cause target directors to eschew any
defensive response to a tender offer. Thus, Mobil would take control of
corporate destiny away from the elected directors of a company as soon
as it becomes the target of a tender offer.
The Mobil decision has ramifications beyond forcing directorial
abdication upon the initiation of a tender offer. Mobil would effec-
tively ban resistance to any tender offer, regardless of whether or not
such passivity is in the best interests of the target company. 27' This
requirement directly conflicts with a director's state law fiduciary duty
to resist takeovers which would be bad for the corporation.272 Under
Mobil's reading of Section 14(e), target directors could be subject to
liability regardless of the fact that their decision to oppose a tender
offer was based on their sound business judgment that the offer was
contrary to the best interests of the company.
Mobil's effect on the ability of target management to fend off po-
tentially harmful takeovers has not gone unnoticed. 273 The Southern
District of New York, in Marshall Field v. Icahn274 recognized that Mo-
bil would preclude directors from fulfilling their fiduciary duty to resist
such takeovers.275 The court rejected a Mobil-based argument that a
target company defensive measure was prohibited by Section 14(e). 276
Refusing to follow Mobil, the court said, "In my view the securities
laws do not bar management from taking action in the best interests of
its shareholders even if this will make more difficult the success of a
269. Marshall Field & Co. v. lcahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) rejected Mobilas an
improper restriction on corporate directors' freedom of action. Id. at 422.
270. See Prentice, supra note 254.
271. Prentice warns that "the [Mobi decision does not take into account the circumstances in
which defensive tactics are in the best interests of the target shareholders." Id. at 357.
272. See Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 621 (1983), which describes the dilemma of target directors faced with a tender offer which
they believe to be contrary to the best interests of their shareholders as "Hobson's Choice" after
Mobil. If they choose not to resist the offer, they will violate their fiduciary duty to resist takeovers
which appear to be harmful. Resistance, however, would put the directors in violation of § 14(e),
according to Mobil. Id. at 650.
273. According to Prentice: "The Mobil decision does not give the target board room to act in
the shareholder's best interests." Prentice, supra, note 254 at 358.
274. 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
275. Id at 422.
276. Id
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disfavored offeror. ' '277
Courts have long recognized the duty of corporate directors to re-
sist takeovers they feel are contrary to the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders. 278 The Mobil demand that directors remain
passive in the face of such offers is irreconcilable with this well-estab-
lished duty.279 It is inconceivable that in passing the Williams Act,
Congress intended to place corporate management in such a dilemma.
Buffalo Forge offers a way out of this predicament. By returning to
the long standing construction of the Williams Act as solely a disclo-
sure law,280 the Second Circuit allows target management to comply
with the statute and fulfill its duty to resist harmful takeovers. Under
Buffalo Forge, directors are assured that any steps taken to fight off a
hostile tender offer will be valid under Section 14(e) as long as they are
fully disclosed. 281 In the event that a tender offer is in the best interests
of corporate shareholders, directors remain free under Buffalo Forge to
acquiesce in the takeover.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second and Third Circuits have returned to the accepted prin-
ciples of application of the Williams Act. They reject Mobil's improper
use of Section 14(e) as an all-purpose tool to undo corporate control
transfers which a particular judge feels are unfair. The Buffalo Forge
holding that a fully disclosed defensive response to a tender offer is
permissible under Section 14(e) is consistent with Congress' intent that
the Williams Act serve only as a disclosure statute.
Furthermore, Buffalo Forge and Schreiber repair the damage done
by Mobil to the fences separating the federal and state fields of corpo-
rate regulation. These two decisions reaffirm state jurisdiction over
277. Id.
278. See Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977), in which the court stated "... manage-
ment has not only the right but the duty to resist by all lawful means persons whose attempt to win
control of the corporation, if successful, would harm the corporate enterprise." Id. at 1161. See
also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 297; Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp.
at 1319.
279. The relative economic merits of tender offers and defensive tactics is the subject of much
scholarly debate, but is beyond the scope of this article. For opposing views on these issues see
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics and
Shareholder's Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Fischel, The Legal Regulation of Tender Offers,
INST. ON SEC. REG., Ann. 1981; and Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW 101 (1979). See also Comment, The Casefor Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1028 (1982).
280. 717 F.2d at 760.
281. See id.
970 CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
claims of breach of fiduciary duty, and confine federal law to its tradi-
tional role of monitoring disclosure in tender offer battles. This tem-
pers the potentially profound impact of Mobil on state corporate law.
Perhaps most importantly, directors of target companies are now
freed of the dilemma created by Mobil. Confronted with a tender offer,
corporate management will now be able to fulfill its duty to take such
action as it determines is in the best interests of the corporation.
Should these interests call for resistance to the tender offer, directors
are assured that if fully disclosed, such measures will not run afoul of
the Williams Act. A vigorous application of the emerging state stan-
dards of directorial conduct in tender offers will safeguard shareholders
in situations where defensive tactics are contrary to their interests.
